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A  POLICY  FOR  PH0110TING  DEPENCE  l'>ND  TECII!10LOGICAL 
CO-OPERATION  AMONG  WEST  EUROPEAN  COUNrRIES 
INTRODUCTION 
For several years different institutions concerned with the security 
and the  economic well-being of Western Europe have been exploring 
possibilities for promoting greater intra-European  co-operation in 
arms  procurement and production,  with both defence  and industrial 
benefits in mind.  Among  them  are·organs of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation  (NATO)  including its informal EUROGROUP,  the 
Independent European Progrrumne  Group  (IEPG),  Western European  Union 
(WEU)  and the Assembly  of Western Eur·opean  Union  (AWEU)  .  Each of 
these has  been  animated mainly by  a  felt need to make  more  efficient 
use  of the resources  committed to military purposes,  in the interest 
of sustaining or enhancing the effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance's 
apparatus  for  deterrence  and defence generally and that of its 
European members=  contribution particularly.  The  Co~~ission cf the 
Europea~ Communities  has  also paid attention to the subject,  in a 
more  circumspect fashion,  principally in the  context of its examination 
of ways  and means  of safeguarding the competence  and  competitiveness 
of high technology  industries within the European Economic  Community 
(EEC) • 
More  recently attempts  have  been  made  to synthesise  the  'defence'  wid 
'industrial'  impulses.  Perhaps  the most notable  instance is the 
Report  submitted to the European Parliament in  1978  by its Political 
Affairs CoMnittee  (drafted by  Mr.  Egon  Klepsch  and  commonly  identified 
as  The  Klepsch Report) •  Together with  an Opinion of  the Parliament•s 
Committee  on  Economic  and Monetary Affairs  (drafted by  Mr.  Tom  Normanton), 
this Report  formed  the basis of the Parliament's Resolution of  14  Jur~e 
1978 which  called on  the Corunission to prepare  an  'action  progr2r.~e for 
the development  and production of conventional  armaments  within the 
freh'T.cwcrl:  8f the  common  i!1du9trial policy. ' 1 - 2  -
The  logic of the defence-industrial synthesis is indisputable. 
Evolving  common  military requirements will not be  advantageous 
unless  accompanied by more €ffective use  of production 
capabilities.  Evolving  a  sounder  industrial base  in defence-
related sectors will not  be possible unless  co-ordinated and  -
consolidated equipment orders are  forthcoming.  Co-operation in 
procurement and  production go hand· in hand,  the  one  requiring 
rationalisation of acquisition agencies'  purchasing policies and 
practices  (the  demand  side of the market) ,  the other requiring 
rationalisation of research,  development and manufacturing capacity 
(the supply side of the market) • 
The  value of the Klepsch Report was  its recognition of this connection. 
But its ideas  could not be  translated directly into an  agenda for 
immediate  action.  They posited a  relationship between.the Commission 
and the  IEPG  - the  former  fulfilling a  supply  side· role complement.ing 
the latter's demand  side functions  - which neither institution \'las 
in a  position to establish.  The  IEPG  had not emerged  as  an effective 
instrument for  the  comprehensive  co-ordtnation of procurelnent.  The 
Commission  needed to inform itself more  fully about the defence 
market  as  a  whole  and to consider more  fully the implications df 
involvement in this market for the attainment of its overall 
industrial policy goals  (and vice versa) •  More  fundamentally,  it 
was  not clear that there existed the political support for what 
Mr.  Klepsch envisaged. 
What .is  the position now  that two years  have elapsed since the 
Resolution of  14  June  1978? 
•  In the first place the  IEPG  has  not  becol'!le,  and is 
unlikely to become  an effective instrument for 
settling common  military requirements  across-the-
board.  It has  made  only  limited headway,  both 
in its intra-European business  and  in the  conduct 
of its  'transatlantic dialogue'  with the United 
States.  This is symptomatic of  a  more  widespread 
reaction agai.nst the  rhetoric of the roid-1970s  and - 3  -
and the expectations engendered thereby.  Recent 
debate  in defence  circles has  indicated the 
emergence of a  consensus for  encouragement of 
more  collaboration on  a  case-by-case basis. 
But there  is negligible support for vesting 
authority in supranational or intergovernmental 
agencies  to manage  the demand  side of the  armaments 
market. 
•  In the second place,  the·Coromission has  received 
and reviewed a  study embodying statistical and 
institutional analyses of defence  procurement 
and production in the EEC  which it solicited from 
the Centre for Defence Studies at Aberdeen 
University in Scotland  (and which is cited 
hereafter as  the Aberdeen  Study).2  It has also 
monitored the continuing debate  on the matters at 
issue,  for example  in the  AWEU  Symposium  on  'A 
European Armaments  Policy'  held in Brussels, 
15-17  October  1979,  and in the  same  Assembly's 
Session held in Paris in December  1979.3  In 
addition,  it.has articulated- and  sought 
acceptance for  - some  elements  in that long-term 
technology programme  for the Community  which was 
alluded to in its Report on structural aspects of 
growth  (which,  like the  Klepsch Report,  appeared 
in June  1978) .4  But the  Co~nission has  not 
discerned enthusiasm for  the  assum~tion, by  itself 
or  any  other agency,  of a  formal  role in the 
management  of the  supply side of the  milita~J 
equipment market. 
In  sum,  circumstances  appear no  more  propitious than they were  in 
1978  for definition of the kind of comprehensive  'action programme' 
envisaged by  the Klepsch study. 
What,  then,  should be  the next step?  In  the  light of the 
developments  outlined,  what  feasible measures  for promoting defence 
and  technological co-operation in the  EEC  do  commend  themselves? 
What  guidelines  can be  suggested for useful action by the Commission 
or by  Member  Governments  in the EEC  (acting in concert with the 
other European members  of NATO  and having regard to.both the 
special position of Ireland and the imminent enlargement of the 
Community)? - 4  -
These  are the questions to be  addressed in this Report.  The 
answers  which  emerge  may  be  summarised  as  follows. 
•  Rather than striving to devise elaborately 
integrated arrangements  for  the demand  and  supply 
sides of the European defence market,  the policy 
emphasis  should be  on  formally separate but 
concerted effort to gain the military and 
industrial benefits  sought. 
•  The  key institutional innovations  required are 
relatively modest:  creation of a  European 
Defence Analysis  Bureau and establishment of a 
European Public Procurement Task  Force,  to help 
nations  choose  sensible purchasing and production 
policies for  themselves  (given that they are  not 
prepared to have  supranational or intergovernmental 
agencies  make  their choices  for  them) .' 
If comparison or contrast is sought between the  concepts underlying 
this exercise  and Mr.  Klepsch's undertaking,  the  simplest 
formulation is that the ends  are more  or less the same  but the 
advocated means  are  significantly different. 
The  Report consists of two main  Parts  and  a  short statement of 
Conclusions.  Part  I  is a  summary  statement of the  essential 
desirability of  some  effort to  rationalis~ defence  procurement 
and production in Western Europe,  and  comment  on its feasibility 
(in principle) .  Incorporated in the  argument are selected data 
on the demand  and  supply sides of the  defence  equipment market 
and observations based  on  the Aberdeen  Study to which  reference 
has  already been made.  Part II is a  presentation of the  case 
for  'separate but concerted effort'  in response  to the defence  and 
industrial imperatives  and incentives to co-operation  (rather than 
more  ambitious organisational experiment).  Underlying this argument 
is an  intel~retation of the unfolding debate  of the late 1970s, 
including inferences  from it about what  governments will and will not 
do  in the interests of defence  and  technological  co-operation on 
their own  account  and  about \''hat  they will and will not countenance 
from  the Cownission. 
'., • 
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I  - INCENTIVES  AND  lMPERATIVES 
Mo•t of the reasons for interest in promoting defence  and technological 
co-operation in Western Europe  have  been  w-ell  rehearsed over the years. 
No  detailed restatement of them is necessary here.  Put brlt!fly, 
there are incentives to co-operation,  in the sense of benefits which 
would accrue to the  member  nations of the EEC  (and the other European 
members  of NATO)  from  harmonisation of requirements  ana  adoption of 
common  systems;  and  imperatives to co-operation,  in the  sense of 
costs that may  be  incurred if states insist on preservinq if not 
self-sufficiency at leas·t  a  high degree of self-reliance. 
The benefits  and  ..  ~c;sts  are ~ar:t.  and industrial in nature. 
Commonality of  equi:~:>ment wot,ld fscilitate interoperability and 
standardisation,  to the direct advantage of the  combat effectiveness 
of front-line  forc~u.  1;ollaborative acquisition arrangements 
would  permit more  efft-,ct~va use  of  rEwearch,  development  and 
production capacitjes  - based  on exploitation of comparative  advantage 
and o:f  Elcalo  and  le~rnirg economies  -·to the  b~nefit of the continui.nq 
competence  and  competitiveness of business enterprises.  Conversely, 
operational and economic penalties are associAted with persistence 
in independent national  ~tances.  Bridging the military and industrial 
domains  is the budgetary  argument&  co-Qperative arrangements would 
mean  a  more efficient uzo  of  ~eaourccs, getting a  given  front-lin$ 
lmd  technological spillovers at lower  cost or qettin9 greater military 
eftE~ctivttnesa and  technological pay-ofis  for  a.  qiven expense. 
The  case  for  ratl.:::~!talisinq defence procurement  and production can  be 
made  exclusively in ~~?fean~ teems,  for  European  reasons.  There 
would  be military and  industrial incentives  and  imperatives even if the 
nat.ions of Western Europe  were  not part of an Atlantic Alliance. 
But it is in the  NATO  framework  that eight of the nine present metlbers 
of the  EEC  make  their currant sacuxity dispositions  (and plan to 
continue to do  so);  tlnd  there are  NATO-wide  pressures for rationalisation, 
I 
I  . 
·j 
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including the  encouragement of greater reciprocity in transatlantic 
trade  - the  'two way  street'  notion  - founded  on  a  still ill-defined 
concept of a  transatlantic division of labour.  Thus  there are 
Atlantici.st arguments  for  intra-European co-operation:  to facilitate 
operation of the European  end of the  'two  w~y street'  (to put the 
case positively),  or to prevent measures  adopted to promote Alliance-
wide  rationalisation,  standardisation and interoperability from 
redounding  largely - if not exclusively - to the benefit of the United 
States  (to put it negatively) . 
These  themes  were  identified - and,  in fact,  elucidated at greater 
length - in the Aberdeen Study,  conducted for the Cotnmission  in 
1978-79.  The  main effort in that investigation,  however,  was 
devoted to the presentation of material  {a)  to facilitate assessment 
of the validity  o~ argwnents  about the desirability of co-operation 
and rationalisation and  (b)  to illrnninate aspects of their feasibility. 
To  these ends  the exercise generated statistical and institutional 
analyses  of defence procurement  and production  arrangements  in EEC 
countries.  It is convenient at this· juncture to  rcvie~.-1  some  fe::1tures 
of  them. 
European  Demand  and  Suppl:I.. 
Among  the points  and  conclusions arising  from  the Aberdeen Study 
were  the  following 
•  The  expenditures  of the Nine  on  major  items of 
defence  equipment  amounted  to some  11 billion 
EUAs  in 1978.  A wider interpretation of what 
constitutes procurement  spending - based on  such 
common  ground as  there is among  countries' 
individual budget classifications  - yielded an 
estimate  for  aggregate  EEC  demand  of  18-19 billion 
EUAs.  This  last amount  is equivalent to  24-26 
billion US  dollars. 
\l)  Regarding  n~_t_~~-~-R.l_ -~?E_t:-ributions  to  the 
tut.d.l,  F  J.ar~c8,  Lhe  F(.dr·)~a  ::.  Republic of Germany 
• • 
•. 
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and the United Kingdom  accounted for 80-85 per 
cent  (whichever way  the  sums  are done) • 
(2)  The  main characteristic of the geographical 
distribution of this expenditure is that what 
EEC  members  buy within the  Corr~unity amounts  to 
over 90 per cent of aggregate  demand,  principally 
because  countries  channel most  - in some  cases 
virtually all - military business to their own 
producers. 
(3)  The  composition of the  demand  in terms of 
equipment categories extends  across virtually 
the full spectrum of military materiel. 
These observations  about procurement - or the demand 
side of the market  - are  summarised  in Table  1  (on 
p.8}.*  . 
•  The  estimated value of the Nine's  aggregate defence-
related sales in 1978 was  c.  22  billion EUAs  (say, 
30 billion US  dollars) • 
(1)  The  'big Three'  accounted for two-thirds 
of this· business. 
(2)  Production for  'own  forces'  is the 
principal preoccupation of each state's armaments 
sector;  but,  to keep  capacity fully employed  and 
to obtain scale and learning  economies,  nations 
exploit extra-Community market opportunities, 
notably  among  less developed countries. 
(3)  The  commodity  composition of the  EEC's 
production is comprehensive:  the Community  of 
Nine  has  the  compet.ence  and capacity to produce 
more  or less all that its m-1n  members'  armed 
forces  need  (and that means  just about all 
t.ypes  of armaments,  with the  exception of 
large missile  systems  and equipment  embodying 
those more  exotic  technologies  which  only  the 
United States has  begun  to explore) . 
These observations  are based on  the data on production  -
or the  supply side of the market  - in Table  2  (on 
p.  9) • * 
*  Tables  1-3  r~.re  reproduced  from  the  Abe1'deen  Study. I 
I 
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Table  1 
ESTIMATED  AGGffi~GATE  DEFENCE  PROCUREMENT  DEMAND 
OF  THE  N~~E,~7~ (in European  Units of Account) 
8.1  Basic Series 
Major  Equipment 
Country*  (NATO  Definition) 
EUAs  bn 
Belgium  o. 3 
Denmark  o. 2 
France  4.1 
FRG  2.4 
Italy  0.8 
Netherlands  0.6 
United Kingdom  2.8 
Total  11.1 
I 
All Procurement I 
(See  text p.  7. 5) 
EUAs  bn  1 
0.3 
0.2 
5.3-5.8 
4.4-4.8 
1.2 
1.2 
4.9-5.2 
i 
! 
18-19  I 
*  Luxembourg  and the Republic of IrelaJ1d ~~  included 
8. 2  Geographical Distribution  (All  P rocuremer,t) 
I 
Area  Amount ·(EUAn  bn)  Percentage  j 
EEC  Countries  16.7  90 
Elsewhere  1;8 
I 
10 
! 
8. 3  Equipment Categories  (All Procurement) 
I  I 
Category  Amount  (EUAs  bn)  Percentage  I 
I 
Land systems  5.1  28 
Sea  systems  4.1  22 
Air systems  5.2  28 
Electronics  2.2  12 
I  Munitions  and other  1.9  10 
I 
j 
Total  I  18.5  100  I 
I 
I  __ _j 
Source  Earlier text and tables:  project worksheets 
Notes  (1)  The  figures  here are estimates,  cons true ted from  fragments 
of earlier material.  They  are  subject to  a11  the  limitations 
of the original data;  in  additio~ consolidation has probably 
involved aggregation which,  strictly speaking,  is improper. 
Therefore  the  figures  must be  regarded as  indications of ordc.-rs 
of magnitude,  no  more  than  that. 
(ii)  Values  may  differ from  L~ose q~oted,  for nominally  si~il~~ 
items,  elsewhere;  coverage  differences  and aggregation  aYe 
the  reasons. • 
• 
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Table  2 
ESTIMATED  AGGREGATE  DEFENCE-RELATED  FINAL  SALES 
OF  THE  NINE,  1978  (in European  Units of Account  (EUAs)) 
9.1  Basic Series  . 
Country*  Sales  (EUAs  bn)  I  Percentage 
Belgium  0.4  1.8 
Denmark  o. 2  0.9 
France  7.7  34.7 
FRG  4.7  21.2 
Italy  2.6  11.7 
Netherlands  1.0  4.5 
United Kingdom  5.6  25.2 
Total  22.2  100.0 
*  Luxembourg  and  the  Republic of Ireland not included 
9. 2  Geographical Distribution 
~a 
Amount  (EUAs  bn)  Percentage  I 
untries  16.7  75  I  l Elsewhere  5.5  25  I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
9. 3  Con:unodi ty Composition 
Product groups  Amount  (EUAs  bn}  Percentage 
Land  systems  4.4  20 
Sea  systems  4.4  20 
Air systems  7.8  35 
Electronics  ) 
5.6  25  Munitions  and other) 
I 
'  Total 
,. 
I 
22.2  100  l 
Source  Earlier text and tables:  project worksheets 
Notes  (i)  The  figures  here  are  estimates,  constructed  from  fragments 
of earlier material.  They  are subject to all the  limitati()ns 
of the original data;  in  addition  consolidation has probably 
involved aggregation which,  strictly speaking,  is improper. 
Therefore  the  figures  must be  regarded as  indications of orders 
of magnitude,  no  more  than  that. 
( i j)  Values  may  differ  from  those quoted,  for nominally  similar 
i teli1S,  elsewhere;  coverage  differences  and aggregation  are 
the  reasons. T
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Consolidation of information on individual nations'  purchases 
and sales,  as  in the synoptic transactions tableau at Table  3 
(opposite), highlights the self-reliance of the EEC  (viz.  the 
dominance  of the  'diagonal'  in the core  9  x  9  matrix),  the 
significance of the United States  among  external sources of 
supply  (viz.  the  'north east'  quadrant of the tableau)  and of 
so-called Third World countries as markets  (viz.  the  'south west' 
quadrant).5 
It is estimated that in 1979  the broad ~ttern of the EEC's  defence-
industrial activity was  more  or less as portrayed in these tables. 
On  present plans,  it will remain  so into the early 1980s.  The 
scale of effort will be higher,  of course,  when  expressed at current 
prices and exchange  rates  (partly because of inflation and partly 
because  of the real growth  to which eight of the Nine  are  committed 
6  to meet  NATO  targets).  Procurement demand  was  pE~·rhaps c.  $30 billion 
in 1979  and may  reach $35-40 billion in 1980  and  1981. 
On  the bosis of these  facts,  the Aberdeen  Study  concluded that  'there 
is reasonably  close  "fit" between the sum  total of the purchases 
of the Nine  and their output or sales'  implying that 
11if the aggregate 
demand  were  co-ordinated  •••• and the research,  development  and 
manufacturing capacities which constitute the EEC's production 
potential could be  similarly co-ordinated,  military needs might be 
satisfied more  efficiently and more  effectively  (or both) .• 7 
Comparison  with the United States 
Comparison with  facts  about American procurement is instructivs. 
The  United States'  budgetary provisions under the headings  'Procurement' 
and  'Research,  Development,  Test  and Evaluation'  for  the  three fiscal 
years  1979,  1980  and  198l·amount to $44  billion,  $49  billion and - 12  -
$57  billion respectively.  Details are  shown  in the  composite 
Table  4  (opposite)  (in which,  incidentally,  the figures  relate 
to the total obligational authority sought by the Department of 
Defense  rather than expected budget outlays  and must  be  interpreted 
with this in mind) •8 
The  significance of the  juxtaposition of European  and American data 
is self-evident.  The  European demand  is of the  same  order of 
magnitude  as  the American  (if due  allowance is made  for  the United 
States'  heavy  current commitments  to strategic programmes).  The 
presumption is,  therefore,  that if the European market really were 
a  market  the Nine  could enjoy the benefits which  are customarily 
held to accrue to the Americans  through operation of a  single 
market of this size.  However,  European  demand  and supply are not 
co-ordinated.  One  consequence of this is that Western Europe is 
vulnerable to  an overbearing commercial  and  technological 
superiority. 
Transatlantic arms  trade  figures  - the  record of trdffic on  the 
'two way  street'  - underscore  the latter point.  The  data in 
Table  5  (oppo.site}  show  overall balances  in the United States' 
favour  for  t.he  years  covered  (although,  as  American officials 
and Congressmen are quick to point out,  if overall defence-related 
payments  were  examined,  the statistics would tell a  different 
9  story).  . 
Whether  this imbalance itself is inimical to the military interests 
of the Atlantic Alliance is debatable.  If it simply expressed  an 
inherent comparative  advantage  in  arms  manufacture in the United 
Stat.es'  favour it would be  unexceptionable  (on  any  grounds).  The 
reality is more  complex.  Because  the European  defence effort is 
fr.agmented  the Americans  probably gain market  advantage  even where 
tr1eir  cost conditions are not fundamentally  favourable,  simply 
because  they get further down  the cost and  learning curves.  In 
• - 13  -
Table  4 
DEFENCE  PROCUREMENT  DEMAND  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES,  1979-81  (in billions of US  dollars) 
. 
Fiscal Years 
Functional Classification 
1979  1980  1981 
• 
Procurement 
Aircraft  12.2  13.5  14.4 
Missiles  3.8  4.7  6.6 
Ships  5.1  6.7  6.1 
Combat Vehicles,  Weapons  and 
Torpedoes  2.0  2.3  3.1 
Ordnance,  Vehicles  and 
Related Equipment  2.2  2.0.  2.6 
Electronics  and Communications  2.7  2.8  3.3 
Other Procurement  3.4  3.7  4.4 
Sub-total  31.4  35.8  40.5 
R.D.T.  & E. 
I  rrechnology  Base  2.5  2.9  3.3 
Strategic Programmes  2.1  2.2  3.4 
Tactical Programmes  5.1  5.2  5.8 
Intelligence  and  Communications  0.8  1.2  1.6 
Management/Support  1.9  2 .o  2.4 
-
Sub-total  12.4  I  13.5  16.5 
Total  43.8  49.3  57.0 
Source:  DeEartment of Defense,  Annual ReEort,  Fiscal Year  1981 
Table  5 
THE  UNITED  STATES'  ARMS  TRADE 
WITH  EUROPE  (in millions of US  dollar·s) 
1975  1  1976  1977 
I 
Sales  (Governmental  &  Com.rnercial)  873 i  1026  1183 
Purchases  (DoD  Procurement)  94  1  47  125 
I 
Source:  Department of Defense - 14  -
this respect there are military penalties  compared with the 
notionally feasible division of labour. 
But it is, of course,  the  industrial price which Western Europe 
may  be  paying that really matters.  Even  the  larger West  European 
nations  cannot reach the minimum  efficient scale of operations in 
many  if not most  areas of high military technology,  so that the field 
10  is easily dominated by  the Americans.  Yet  - and this is where 
the argument  comes  full circle - since the scale of the  (theoretical) 
European internal market is comparable with the United States• 
domestic market,  this would not be  the  case if \vestern Europe's 
potential could be realised through rationalisation. 
There is every indication that this industrial  'price'  is getting 
higher  and higher  as  time  goes  by.  Trends  in military technology 
are  running in directions  favouring  the  large-scale operation in 
either R  & D  or production  (or both)  and/or manufacture of  long  runs. 
Where  the  technological  frontier  i~ being pushed outward  - as,  for 
example,  in next-generation communicationsr  command,  control  a'!d 
intelligence  (C3I)  systemsr  in miniaturisation for munitions,  in 
experiment with  new  materials  - the size of the  R  & D effort required 
precludes  the smaller-scale undertaking.  t-lhere  there is reaction 
against alleged over-sophistication - as  in battlefield combat aircraft 
(for instance)  - the  argument is about  cost/numbers trade-offs.  The 
less complex  system commends  itself because  one  can  have  more  of 
them,  thus  similarly favouring  the  larger-scale,  longer-run 
manufacturing operation. 
The Defence-Industrial Nexus •••• 
It is in this respect that  'defence'  ineentives  and  imperatives 
merge  with wider  'industrial'  considerations.  There is a  general 
appreciation that the  vulne:rA.bili ty of Western  Europe  t.o  being 
•  ! 
• - 15  -
overborne  by  a  technological superior United States which is 
apparent in the military-industrial domain obtains across the 
whole  spectrum of high technology activities. 
recurred in EEC  industrial policy statements. 
The  theme  has 
•  In the  seminal Colonna Memorandum  (1970)  one of 
the three reasons  given  for  evolving a  common 
industrial policy was  'to achieve  a  reasonable 
degree  of economic  and technological independence 
from  the Community's  trading partners' .11 
•  In one  of his early speeches to the European 
Parliament  (February  1.977),  Commission President 
Jenkins  stressed the EEC's potentially important 
role in the  area of  advanced  technology  and 
stated that a  'Community  strategy for  these 
sectors is urgently required'.12 
•  The  Commission's  report on  st.ructural aspects of 
growth  (June  1978)  stated bluntly that  'the 
competitiveness of European industry will depend 
on its ability to mobilize  new  technologies •.•• •13 
Nor  is the  connection here  sir:lply one ·cf defence  ~rulnerability 
as  a  particular instance of a  wider  apprehension.  The  high technology 
sectors in which it is perceived are,  to a  large extent,  precisely 
those which  are significant in the military context:  e.g.,  aerospace, 
computer  systems,  telecommunications,  e~ectronic circuit technology  . 
••••  and the Klepsch Proposals 
As  noted,  synthesis of  (a)  the  'defence'  and related  'military-industrial' 
motivations  for  co-operation and  (b)  the  'technological'  and particularly 
'advanced technology industry'  motivations was  the  essence  of the 
Klepsch Report of 1978.  In  the  Foreword to a  commercially-published 
version of its text,  a  leading European ·Parliamentarian,  Geoffrey Rippon, 
commended 
' •...  the clear way  in which it demonstrates  that there 
is a  direct link between  Com.'11uni ty industrial policy - 16  -
and effective co-operation in European  armaments 
procurement.  Thus  the Community  cannot  achieve 
a  meaningful  common  industrial policy unless this 
includes military as well as civil products. 
Bodies  such  as  NATO  and the  IEPG •..•  cannot  succeed 
unless  they use  the  unique potential of the 
European  Community  to organise and structure the 
industrial aspects of armaments  production. •14 
Hence  the call - in the Resolution of  14  June  1978  - for  an  'action 
programme'  to delineate how  the EEC's  institutions  {notably the 
Commission itself)  might  contribute,  in association with Alliance 
organs  and the IEPG,  to fulfilment of Mr.  Klepsch's design. 
What  was  not recognised at this juncture was,  first,  that participating 
governments might  show  no  inclination to transform the  IEPG  into an 
authoritative body  for co-ordinating European  equipment  demands 
across-the-board;  secondly,  that when  the question of a  role  for 
Community  institutions was  raised so explicitly the merjts  and 
demerits  of their involvement would  come  under  unprecedently searching 
scrutiny;  and,  thirdly,  that the  wisdom of an  'integrationist' 
approach to resoiution of the problems  of the defence-industrial 
nexus  and the desirability of grand institutional innovation would 
be called into question.  Yet this is what might have  been  foreseen, 
and this is what has  transpired.  As  a  result,  progress towards 
more  efficient use of the  resources which  the Nine allot to defence 
and  towards  an effective policy for European technological 
collaboration is more  likely to be  achieved - at least in the  short-to-
medium  run  - by  somewhat different means. 
II - ISSUES,  INITIATIVES  AND  INSTITUTIONS 
The  need  for policy initiatives in both.the defence procurement 
(demand  side)  and production  (supply side)  domains  is not in dispute. 
However it does  not follow  that the best prescription is • 
- 17  -
institutionalised co-ordination,  on both sides of the market  and 
with respect to their interaction. 
In fact,  reflection on the Klepsch  Report itself - and on  the 
debate  which it prompted - suggests that it would be  preferable 
•  to emphasise  separate but concerted policy 
initiatives in furtherance  of  (1)  the defence 
and related military-industrial objectives 
and  (2)  the technological  and  related high 
technology promotion objectives,  rather than 
pursuing  a  formally integrated approach; 
•  to attempt modest  institutional innovation 
which is evolutionary rather than radical in 
concept. 
This  is emphatically not to denigrate  the diagnosis incorporated 
in the Klepsch  Report.  It is simply to suggest that headway 
towards  the relevant goals is more  likely to be  achieved by an 
oblique  app=oach. 
Specifically,  debate  in the defence  community within Western Europe 
in the  two years since June  1978 has brought about clarification 
of both nations'  perceptions of the  pro~lem and their attitudes to 
possible solutions.  The  upshot is that the best immediate policy 
objective is creation of the conditions in which  EEC  countries  (and 
the other European members  of NATO)  may  be  induced voluntarily 
to engage  in more  collaborative efforts.  On  the industrial policy 
side,  the  experience of the Commission  in exploring methods  for 
harnessing  the purchasing power of all public  agencies  - military 
and civil - to the pursuit of technology policy goals  suggests 
that this approach offers greater promise than  one  in which the 
Commission might appear to be  seeking  a  distinctive and direct 
role with  respect to defence  arrangements. - 18  ·-
The  Defence  Debate  1978-79 
Prominent in the recent debate on co-operation policy possibilities 
within the defence  fraternity has been recognition of the virtue 
of arrangements which  recognise  two  things.  'I'he  first is that 
diverse  values  and interests enter the  reckoning in decision-making 
about defence  procurement  and production,  and legitimately so. 
The  second is that,  although nations  acknowledge  interdependence, 
they are unwilling to ascribe  to any  supranational or intergovernmental 
agency effective authority in relation to either formulation of 
their military requirements or management  of their defence  industrial 
capacities.  Together,  these  conditions mean  t.hat there is no 
commitment  to institutionalising interdependence.  Accordingly 
progress  depends  on maximising collaboration on  a  case-by-case 
b  .  15 
a.s~s. 
More  than  anything else this calls for  fresh effort  (a)  to make 
nations better informed about the potential intra-European market 
(and  relate0  AtJ.APti.c  t.rade possibilities)  and  (b)  to generate 
specific knowledge  on  the full costs  and benefits of alternative 
modes  of co-operation in particular instances.  The  latter is the 
critical requirement at this  juncture:  to enable the explicit 
incorporation in policy calculations of the wider  economic  and 
social aspects of procurement choices.  That does  not happen  at 
present;  and  one  reason why  states approach bold  schemes  for promoting 
collaboration with evident caution is their fear that the efficiency 
gains which protagonists promise may  be  bought at too high  a  price 
in terms of other values. 
To  develop this  argument.  The  case  for  encouraging greater defence 
co-operation among  NATO's  European  mexnbers  has  been made  almost 
exclusively on efficiency grounds.  States'  lukewarm  responses  to 
many  initiatives have  been attributed  t®  unwarranted attention to 
self-interest,  sheer self-indulgence or straight obstructiveness. 
• • 
• 
' 
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Yet  technical efficiency is ~~  the purpose of the procurement 
exercise.  It is ~,  therefore,  a  satisfactory criterion for 
policy choice.  Furthermore, it is not mere obstinacy that makes 
nations wary  of grand designs but  an  understw~dable and  legitimate 
determination to take other interests into account;  these  nhould 
accordingly be  construed as  constraints  on  choice rather than 
obstacles to goal  attainm~nt._ 
A  simple efficiency criterion,  although intuitively appealing,  is 
inadequate because West Europeans•  sense of security depends  on 
more  than acquiring defence capabilities as  cheaply as possible. 
Political cohesion and the political self-confidence of every 
member  state are  also significant.  So  too are  the  economic well-
being and social stability of each  country.  The  most efficient 
use of resources  - in the technical sense  - is  a  desirable objective, 
but not the only one.  Security would not be  enhanced by its 
uncritical pursuit.  Sch~mes for  promoting more efficient procurellien~ 
which  led to divisive dispute  (arising,  say,  from  inequity in the 
treatmen·t  accorded different  ountrie~)  might do more  harm  than 
good,  because  they would  damage  political cohesion.  Similarly 
'rationalisation'  which entailed rar \_d_and  radical structural 
adjustment for particular countries,  and therefore possible economic 
and social hardship,  might affect  secur~ty adversely.  Certainly 
it is likely to be  worth  forgoing ~  efficiency for  the  sake  of 
avoiding dissension and distress. 
The question is:  how  much?  Are  there significant trade-offs bet\'leen 
efficiency and other policy objectives  and  how  might  these be  exposed? 
Can  the efficiency claims for  co-operation policy options be  accepted 
uncritically?  Just how  significant are  the wider  economic  and social 
aspects of defence-related activity which  account  for nations' 
insistence that  'other values  and interests'  are given due weight in 
policy-making? - 20  -
Putting a  complicated argument briefly,  the recent debate has 
made  two  things very clear. 
•  The  potential gains  from  collaborative procurement 
have  been grossly overstated in many  quarters. 
To  be  sure,  there  are  ~!itary advantages  to 
interoperability.  However,  since NATO's  concept 
of operations  for the defence of north-west Europe 
is based on  ground  formations  (with air support} 
fighting  in  'layer-cake'  dispositions  on  the 
Central Front,  the  scope  for  flexible use  of 
forces  is strictly limited.  Claims  concerning 
the benefits of standardised systems  also require 
qualification.  There  is merit in diversity, 
operationally speaking;  and  logistic arrangements 
cannot be  simplified substantially unless 
commonality obtains across-the-board.  The  scale 
of budgetary savings  from  co-operative 
acquisition has  been over-rated too.  Savings 
are attainable through exploitation of scale  and 
learning economies.  But cost reduction 
opportunities depend  on  the mode  of joint 
procurement adopted,  .. nd the  co-d8velop!nent 
and co-production  arrangements  most  likely to 
find  favour  are precisely the  ones  least likely 
to yield budgetary benefits.l6 
•  It is erroneous  to dismiss states'  reservations 
about grand designs  for rationalised procurement 
and production as  symptomatic of inexcusable 
short-sightedness  and unenlightened self-interest. 
Resistance to the idea that there  should be  a 
pooling of research  resources  to eliminate  'waste' 
is not just  chauvin~stic sentiment but a  reminder 
that one  man's  waste  is another's essential 
i.nvestment in the pursuit of knowledge.  Reluctance 
to envisage  joint ventures  which  do  not  involve 
participe.tion in development  stems  from  understandable 
desires to secure  access  to  technology  (or  retain 
existing competence) .  \~hen it co~Tles  to production, 
revealed preferences for  licen5ing,  formally-
negotiated reciprocity or elaborate co-production 
formulae  reflect no  more  than prudent regard for 
employment  and other economic  considerations 
(including technology transfer opportunities)., 
Moreover  there is good  reason  why  such  considerations 
loom  large in decision-r.1akers'  calculations  currently. 
Nations  are  wrestli~g with problems  of structural 
• 
• - 21  -
adjustment which  threaten to get worse  before  they 
get better.  To  risk precipitating economic 
hardship is to risk exacerbating fissiparous 
tendencies  in domestic politics.  And  it is well 
understood that social discontent may  be  as 
damaging to a  country's sense of security as 
inadequate military preparations. 
All  in all,  therefore,  it is hardly surprising that caution 
characterises governments'  approaches  to co-operation.  There 
~  practically significant trade-offs to be  considered between 
'efficiency'  and  'other values•. 
Priority for  Information  and Analysis 
Guidelines  for policy initiatives and institutional innovation 
responsive  to defence  and military-industrial motivatious  for 
co-operation arise naturally  from this appraisal. 
There is no  general support in Western  Europe  for  fully-integrated 
arrangements  based  on  (a)  settling identical military requirements 
and  (b)  instituting highly centralised management of  armaments 
production capacities.  However,  nation~ _continue--t"O -be -"a1spos-ed-
~---- ~- -- ~---
--~~--~~plore -eollabor-id.:l.ve  opportunities  case-by-case.  It is 
~- --- -- _  .... --- _  __...._,  .. -------- --.....- ............ 
practicable therefore to try to facilitate more  co-operatic:_m  aJ.:g_n_g  __ 
such _l:j,nes,  the  aim- being-to impi::ove  efficiency subject to the 
constraints that have  been discussed.  (And  the meaning  of this 
last qualification is that institutional  innovetion should be broadly 
acceptable to all and unacceptable  to none,  and should not  imply 
change  that would  complicate  the problems  of structural adjustment 
or otherwise  weaken  the  economy  of  any  country) . 
Fundamentally it is a  matter of enabling states to make  better-
informed choices,  in the  light of the several values  and  interests 
which  they h&ve  to take  into account.  ·Ther~ 1s  a  ne~d for fuller - 22  -
information,  about  requirements  on  the one hand,  available products 
(or productive  capacities)  on  the other;  and  for objective 
analysis,  to display alternative solutions to choice problems  and 
in so doing illuminate  the possible trade-offs  among  objectives. 
Information.  This  means  comprehensive  data,  systematically 
assembled  and presented,  on  the demand  and  supply sides of the West 
European military equipment market  (Hith counterpart facts  on  American 
needs  and resources). 
•  The  demand  side information consists of details of 
nations•  envisaged equipment purchasP.s,  specifying 
role  and mission,  essential performance  requirements, 
estimated numbers  required,  proposed in-service 
dates  and  the  financial  commitment  foreshadowed  in 
medium- or  longer-term budgetary planning.  (The 
IEPG's  equipment  replacement  schedules  go  some  way 
towards  meeting this specification.) 
•  The  supply side  information consists of full facts 
and  figures  - including cost and workload data -
about  the  research,  d7elopment  and  production 
capabilities of vlest European  economies.  (The 
studies set in hand by  the  IEPG  and the Standing 
Armaments  Committee  (SAC)  of Western  Europt.~an 
Union  may  provide  a  foundation  for  the comprehensive 
material required under this heading.) 
Raw  data of this sort could be  used  (a)  to enable every  case of 
synchronous  demand  to be  identified,  together with  some  indication 
of expected time-scales  and of the  expenditures  which nations  foresee 
on present plans;  and  (b)  to enable  'matching'  developnlent/production 
capacity to be  identified with  reasonable precision:  that is to say, 
to define  the  set of collaborative  procurement possibilities.  These 
might involve  a  major  demand  met  from  several  sources of supply,  a 
set of compa-tible  demands  met  from  several  sources  of supply,  a  • family 
of weapons'  (equipment)  produced by  a  formal  or  ad hoc,  permanent or 
temporary,  consortium of manufacturing enterprises  (in effect,  a  'family 
of·  firms •) ,  several compatible  oL·  a  single unique  demand  met  from  a 
sole source  of  supply.  There  are  numerous  permutations  and,  therefore, 
many  different collaborative procurement programme  options. 
Analysis.  This  means  the authoritative examination of options,  to 
illu.rninate  'the full  costs  and benefits of alternative modes  of 
co-operation  in particular instances'  (against,  ideally,  a  benchmark 
of independent national acquisitions) ..  This  would yield thorough 
elucidation of specific schemes,  including  implied trade-offs between 
efficiency  (or cost-effectiveness). and associated economic  and social - 23  -
repercussions.  In other words it would  reveal  - in a  way  that 
intuition and  judgement as at present applied do  not - just what 
price in forgone  efficiency is implied by arrangements  for wide 
participation or equitable work-sharing or employment maintenance 
(or,  put the other t.'lay,  what burdens  might  be  implied by  adoption 
of the least cost solution).  With  the aid of such analysis, 
nations would be  better able to select their preferred course of 
action.  They  would  know  the  'price'  of self-sufficiency as 
compared with collaborative opportunities.  The potential 
significance of this should not be underestimated.  In the absence 
of explicitly-calculated  'prices'  s·tates probably act conservatively. 
They  assume  the inefficiency premium  to.be  lower  than it is in fact, 
or the economic  costs of adjustment to  b~ higher than they really 
are.  This  alone could account for the widespread disposition to 
view co-operation  us  a  strategy of last resort,  to be  espoused only 
when  independent national effort is prohibitively expensive  (in the 
exact sense) . 
The  analysis element in this prescription is the critical one,  of 
course.  Establishment of a  capability for performing the relevant 
cost-benefit calculations is the crucial initiative required. 
In all but one  respect it is an  innovation which it should not be 
difficult to make.  The  basic information for the necessary work 
ca.n  be  collected·  and collated.  The  analytical tools required ~ 
familiar.  In fact  some  specific work  has been  done  to define the 
17  type of options analysis that is proposed.  The  problematical 
issue is that of institutional affiliation.  The  IEPG  is one  candidate. 
But governments  have  rejected - or ignored - suggestions that the 
Group  be  established on  a  more  formal  footing,  with a  full-time 
Secretariat and its own  offices;  and for  so  long as it is not permanently 
organised it is hard to see  how  it could effectively supervise  an 
authoritative  'information and analysis'  agency. 
for  setting-up an office under  the aegis of WEU. 
A case  could be  made 
There  are difficulti.es 
with this notion too,  however,  given WEU's  limited membership  and the 
low profile it has  assumed. 
On  balance,  therefore,  it would  seem  p~~ferable to establish an 
independent entity,  constituted as  (say)  a  European Defence  ~1alysis 
Bur~  and managed  as  such,  but having close links with the  IEPG, - 24  -
with \'lEU  and  (for certain limited purposes)  with  t.he  Commission of 
th  E  C  i 
.  18  e  uropean  ommun  tles. 
The  Commission's  Industrial Policy Initiatives 1978-80 
In parallel with the debate  on  co-operation that has  taken place in 
the defence  fraternity since mid-1978  there have  been developments 
in the evolution of thought about  a  common  industrial policy for 
the EEC.  Of  these,  several are  relevant to the question:  should 
the Commission accept and  affirm that concept of its role  ~js-a-vis 
management of Western Europe's  defence  industrial capacities v:hich 
the Klepsch Report  envisaged? 
A careful reading of the developments  in question hig-hlights  ·the 
following  considerations  end  dlsclos~s an  inherc:.nt  dilemma. 
•  The· unwillingness of EEC  members xo  contemplate 
ascribing authority to any  supranational or 
inter-governmental  body  with  respect to organisation 
of the demand  side of the West  European military 
equipment market has its counterpart on  the  supply 
side.  No  enthusiasm has  been  shown  by  the 
governments  of  the Nine  for  making  creation of  a 
'structured'  arms  market  a  key  elecient in the 
Community's  industrial policy  for  the  1980s  and 
beyond.  (Indeed,  although  the opposition in the 
European Parliament t.o  any  initiative in this sense 
was  insufficient to block the broad Resolution of 
14  J·une  1978,  the  reasonable expectation must be 
that it would not be possible to muster  the  required 
support in the--council of Hinistcrs for  dE'finite 
proposals.) 
•  At  the  same  time  there  does  appear  to be  support 
in principle for  the generalised industrial policy 
aspirations which  the Commission  and others have 
voiced.  It is recognised that the  Co~~unity 
should pay at least as  much  attention to the well-
being of European industry as it does  to that of 
European  agriculture;  that industrial policy - 25  -
should amount  to more  than  eliminating obstacles 
to competition and easing the difficulties of 
sectors in distress;  and that priority in 
'positive'  policy-making for particular sectors 
should go  to programmes  designed to safeguard 
and  enhance  the  competence  and competitiveness 
of Western Europe  in areas of high  technology. 
(The  latter was  a  dominant  theme  in the  1978 
Report  on structural aspects  of growth.)19 
The  dilemma arises because  the high technology  sectors  for which  a 
Community  strategy is  'urgently required'  are precisely those in 
which defence  demand is important  (and,  indeed,  in which drawing 
a  line between civil and military business is difficult) . 20  How 
can_the Commission define  a  •strategy'  for these yet avoid appearing 
to over-ride member  governments'  insistence that policy for military-
industrial capacities is a  national prerogative? 
The  answer is:  'only with difficulty,  but it should be  possible, 
with ingenuity'.  What  is important is that the  emphasis  be  on the 
primacy  of industrial objectives,  with special reference to advanced 
technology promotion,  so far  as  Community  institutions are  concerned. 
The  latter's intrusion in the defence  domain is acceptable to member 
nations  only  - and even  then not assuredly  - to the extent that it is 
an  incidental effect,  or inescapable concomitant,  of measures 
necessary to strengthen the West  European manufacturing base. 
It is in this spirit,  and with circumspection,  that the  Commission  has 
proceeded in the recent past.  Simplifying a  complicated story, it 
has  moved  along  two  axes of advance  and,  most  recently,  along  one 
particular path which is potentially very  prom~sing. 
•  Under  the rubric of  'competition policy•  and the 
opening-up of the EEC's  internal market,  attention 
has been paid to public procurement:  and  there 
exists  a  Directive of  21  December  1976  which 
represents  a  first stage in liberal'ising government 
purchasing practices.  {Exclusions  and  escape 
clauses  limit the  effectiveness of this instrument, 
but it is a  basis  for  future  action.) - 26  -
•  Under  the  rubric of  'sectoral policy'  for  advanced 
technology promotion,  programmes  have been 
defined for  encouraging  telematique  technology, 
based 6n combinations of  ~~mputers, microelectronics 
and telecommunications  (to cite the most important 
instance);  and more modest initiatives have been  21  taken with respect to other sectors  (e.g.  aerospace). 
These are the  two  basic  'axes of advance'.  Defence  equipment 
purchases,  and  indeed many  civil acquisitions of high technology 
goods,  lie outside the  scope of the public procurement Directive 
as at present observed and  enforced.  However,  consideration 
could  - and should  - be given to bringing more  of them within its 
ambit.  Measures of military significance certainly will be taken 
within the  framework of the telematique programme,  for there are 
important defence applications of the  relevant technologies.  The 
significant thing is that the Commission's interest is in the 
technologies first and  in their defence applications only incidentally. 
This  too is the emphasis  in the steps  that have  been  taken along the 
'particular path which is potentially very promising'. 
•  Intra-European co-ordination 'of public procurement 
demands  for  the products of high technology 
industry is a  notion \<lhich,  after being under 
consideration for  some  time,  attracted particular 
effort during  1979-80  (culminating in an  informal 
meeting of industry Ministers  from  the Nine,  held 
at Venice in June  1980).22  The  rationale is 
straightforward.  Governments  are the major 
customers  of  those advanced industrial sectors 
in which it is important to develop Western 
Europe's  technica.l  expertise and  commercial 
stature in the  1980s  and beyond.  It is sensible, 
therefore,  to explore the scope  for  using public 
authorities'  purchasing power  to best effect, viz. 
avoiding  needless  duplication of R  & D effort, 
devising  co-operative production arrangements 
where  appropriate,  sharing knowledge  gained  from 
operational experi.ence.  This  applies  to 
governments'  expenditures on all relevant goods 
and services,  civil and military.  However, - 27  -
to  echo  an earlier point,  the prime interest 
of Community  institutions is in that 
strengthening of the industrial base that 
should eventuate and  not in how  nations• 
manage  their public sectors. 
It is too soon to  judge  how  far and  how  fast governments will be 
prepared to go  along this  route.  Suffice it to say that there are 
hopeful  auguries:  not least because  no-one is being asked to  cede 
authority to  Community  institutions,  only to  consider co-ordinating 
policy under their auspices. 
Priority for  Informal  Co-ordination 
In the light of this experience,  what is the logical next step  for 
policy initiatives and institutional innovation  responsi- .. ·e to 
technological  - and,  specifically,  'advanced technology promotion'  -
motivations  for great.er intra-European co-operation? 
Fundamentally it is a  matter of mobilising the potential which the 
masse de  manoeuvre of governments'  purchasing power  represents  in 
furtherance of industrial  policy objectives.  That  means  building 
on  foundations  already laid.  More  important, it means  continuing 
to do  business as it has  been conducted  to date,  i.e. on the basis 
of agreement among  participating states. 
The most practical initial measure  which could be taken  is the 
collection and  collation of authoritative and up-to-date information 
on the scale and pattern of public procurement outlays  (civil and 
military)  in the  EEC,  with special reference to expenditure with 
designated  high  technology industries.  During  the exploratory 
phase  of  any policy evoluti.on it is possible and it is excusable  -- 28  -
though not necessarily desirable - to proceed without precise 
knowledge of relevant magnitudes.  It is impracticable  - and 
certainly unwise  - to  rema~n in the statistical shadows  beyond 
this stage. 
It should be possible for the Commission  - in consultation with 
the Statistical Office of the Communities  - in the first 
instance to produce,  or have produced  for it, a  basic reference 
document on  (a}  the size and character of all public purchasing 
in the EEC,  (b)  the agencies  responsible for disbursing funds 
and  (c)  the sectors of industry receiving  them  (with the most 
detailed analyses  confined to the  'designated high  technology 
industries').  Thereafter it would  be useful to establish 
routine reporting on the market in which governments-as-purchasers-
deal with advanced-technology-industries-as-suppliers.  The 
model  for  such regular scrutiny might  be what  the  Commission 
does vis-a-vis aerospace,  procedures which yield an invaluable 
annual  statistical bulletin  (and,  doubtless,  much  more  besides). 
To  be better informed  about the anatomy  and physiology of West 
European public markets  is one thing.  To  develop policies for 
their management with the maintenance  and  sustenance of a 
sound  'high technology'  industrial base iri mind is another, 
especially when  the sine qua  non of effective action is 
existence of  a  durable  consensus  for it.  In these circumstances 
the most practical step towards definition of  a  feasible 
progr~mme of action for  EEC  members  might be the  establishment 
of an intergovernmental body  expressly tasked  to  draw  up  such 
a  programme. 
One  of the most successful  examples  in recent years of concerted 
action to deal with perceived  'vulnerability'  is NATO's  Long 
Term  Defence Programme  (LTDP).  It wa.s  in 1977  - and at  'Heads - 29  -
of Government'  level  - that this initiative was  launched,  in  th~ 
sense that the Alliance nations  registered agreement that something 
should be done to address a series of problems.  The  job of 
identifying the specific actions  necessary to overcome  (or  alleviate) 
the problems  and capable of  commanding  support among  the 
Organisation's members  was  entrusted to  several Task Forces,  composed 
of officials from  individual national bureaucracies  (aided  by 
international staffs).  These met  from  time to time during  1977-78 
and discussed appropriate  and  feasible measures  in a  pragmatic way, 
helped by  the fact that their work was  performed outside the 
political limelight.  They  reported to Ministers in 1978.  Almost 
without  exception the  teams'  recommendations  were  endorsed.  In 
effect,  governments  became  committed  to  the· now  substantive LTDP. 
It is this  kind of institutional arrangement which might  now  be 
considered in the  EEC,  to give  a  new  impetus  to both development 
of a  general strategy for the promotion of technological co-operation 
and definition of particular techniques  for the use of public 
procurement  monies  as one instrun1ent of such  a  strategy. 
Specifically,  the Council of Ministers  could convene  a  European 
Public Procurement  Task  Force which,  emulating such features of 
the method of working of its precursors in the  NATO  exercise as 
might  be appropriate,  would  seek to identify that policy to which 
all  Corr~unity states could  subscribe for  the more  effective use 
of governments'  purchasing power  in the  furtherance of industrial 
policy objectives.  (This ·is  not  the place to attempt  exact 
definition of  such  a  body's  terms  of  reference or to  eA?ress 
views  as  to its possible compositton.  On  the latter p0int, 
however,  it is clear that to  be  effective the  Task  Force would 
have  to comprise  senior officials from  member  states,  supported by 
officers of the Commission  (and,  if practicable,  the  Economic  and 
Social  Committee)  and  by outside experts.) - 30  -
CONCLUSIONS 
There is a  strong case  for facilitating further  co-operation in 
defence procurement and production among  the members  of the  EEC 
and,  specifically,  for devising  new  institutional arrangements 
to  this  end.  The  Klepsch Report to the European Parliament in 
1978 represented  a  particularly persuasive statement of it; 
and that is why  the Parliament passed an important Resolution, 
based on the Report,  on  14  June  1978.  However,  during the 
period which has  elapsed since that Resolution - which called 
on the Commission to prepare  'an action programme  for  the 
development  and production of conventional  armaments  within 
the  framework of the  common  industrial policy'  - two  things 
have  become  clear. 
First,  the  IEPG  is unlikely  to  evolve into  an  effective 
instrument for settling common  military requirements 
across-the-board.  Indeed,  the recent debate within 
the defence  fraternity has  indi.cated the existence of 
a  consensus  for  effort to  encouraqe more  collaboration 
on a  case-by-case basis, but little support for vesting 
real authority in a  supranational or intergovernmental 
agency  to manage  the demand  slde of the dl."'lla.ments  market. 
Secondly,  the Commission is making  some  headway  towards 
its goal of strengthening the position of those European 
high technology industries whose  competence  and 
competitiveness  must  be  safeguarded:  for example,  by 
effort to ensure the more  effective use of public 
contracts  - military and civil  - to this  end.  But 
there is little enthusiasm for the Commission,  or any 
other agency,  assuming  a  formal  role in the management 
of the supply side of the military equipment market. 
The  time is not propitious,  therefore,  for definition by  the 
Commission of  the  kind of  comprehensive  'action programme' 
envisaged by  lhe  Klepsch study.  It would be well-advised to 
pursue  a  less spectacular approach,  base~ on separate but 
concerted effort in pursuit of security and industrial policy 
objectives  and  on modest institutional innovation. - 31  -
The most useful actions which  could be taken in the  next  few  years 
would  be based on  (a)  greater and  more  systematic  encouragement of 
case-by-case collaboration in defence procurement and production; 
and  (b)  more  energetic exploitation of  the potential  for  use of 
public contracts  to ensure the establishment of  a  sound  and 
balanced structure of  high technology industries in the  EEC. 
So  far  as  institutional innovation is concerned,  the prime 
requirements  are for 
A European Defence Analysis  Bureau,  to serve as  a 
clearing  house  for  information on defence  needs  and 
military productive capacities,  and  hence  for  the 
identification of collaborative procurement 
possibilities;  and  to  conduct  independent analyses 
of collaborative procurement programme options, 
displaying  the  full  range of social  and  economic 
costs and benefits. 
A  Europtan Public Procurement Task Force  to devise 
that policy  to  which all Community  states could 
subscribe,  for the more  effective use of governments' 
purchasing power  - for civil and military products  -
to maintain and sustain a  'high technology' 
industrial base. 
The purpose of  the  former  would be  to  ensu~e that,  in the defence 
domain,  no  opportunity for  co-operative procurement goes 
unidentified and  no  collaborative programme option is rejected on 
the basis of merely intuitive or impressionistic  assessment of its 
merits.  The  aspiration of 'the latter would  be to define the 
arrang·crnents  necessary  to  ensure that,  with the furtherance of 
industrial policy objectives in mind,  no  civil or  ~tlitary public 
procurement choice is made  without  explicit attention to  those 
objectives. 
Aberdeen 
September  1980  DG - 32  -
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